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Abstract—Although deep neural networks (DNNs) have
achieved great success in many tasks, they can often be fooled
by adversarial examples that are generated by adding small but
purposeful distortions to natural examples. Previous studies to
defend against adversarial examples mostly focused on refining
the DNN models, but have either shown limited success or re-
quired expensive computation. We propose a new strategy, feature
squeezing, that can be used to harden DNN models by detecting
adversarial examples. Feature squeezing reduces the search space
available to an adversary by coalescing samples that correspond
to many different feature vectors in the original space into a single
sample. By comparing a DNN model’s prediction on the original
input with that on squeezed inputs, feature squeezing detects
adversarial examples with high accuracy and few false positives.
This paper explores two feature squeezing methods: reducing the
color bit depth of each pixel and spatial smoothing. These simple
strategies are inexpensive and complementary to other defenses,
and can be combined in a joint detection framework to achieve
high detection rates against state-of-the-art attacks.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) perform exceptionally
well on many artificial intelligence tasks, including security-
sensitive applications like malware classification [26] and face
recognition [37]. Unlike when machine learning is used in
other fields, security applications may involve sophisticated
adversaries responding to the deployed systems. Recent studies
have shown that attackers can force deep learning object classi-
fication models to misclassify images by making imperceptible
modifications to pixel values. The maliciously generated inputs
are called “adversarial examples” [10, 40] and are normally
crafted using an optimization procedure to search for small,
but effective, artificial perturbations.
The goal of this work is to harden DNN systems against
adversarial examples by detecting adversarial inputs. Detecting
an attempted attack may be as important as predicting correct
outputs. When running locally, a classifier that can detect
adversarial inputs may alert its users or take fail-safe actions
(e.g., a fully autonomous drone returns to its base) when it
spots adversarial inputs. For an on-line classifier whose model
is being used (and possibly updated) through API calls from
external clients, the ability to detect adversarial examples may
enable the operator to identify malicious clients and exclude
their inputs. Another reason that detecting adversarial exam-
ples is important is because even with the strongest defenses,
adversaries will occasionally be able to get lucky and find an
adversarial input. For asymmetrical security applications like
malware detection, the adversary may only need to find a single
example that preserves the desired malicious behavior but is
classified as benign to launch a successful attack. This seems
like a hopeless situation for an on-line classifier operator, but
the game changes if the operator can detect even unsuccessful
attempts during an adversary’s search process.
Most previous work on hardening DNN systems, including
adversarial training and gradient masking (details in Sec-
tion 2-C), focused on modifying the DNN models themselves.
In contrast, our work focuses on finding simple and low-cost
defensive strategies that alter the input samples but leave the
model unchanged. Section 2-D describes a few other recent
proposals for detecting adversarial examples.
Our approach, which we call feature squeezing, is driven
by the observation that the feature input spaces are often
unnecessarily large, and this vast input space provides ex-
tensive opportunities for an adversary to construct adversarial
examples. Our strategy is to reduce the degrees of freedom
available to an adversary by “squeezing” out unnecessary input
features. The key idea is to compare the model’s prediction
on the original sample with its prediction on the sample
after squeezing, as depicted in Figure 1. If the original and
squeezed inputs produce substantially different outputs from
the model, the input is likely to be adversarial. By comparing
the difference between predictions with a selected threshold
value, our system outputs the correct prediction for legitimate
examples and rejects adversarial inputs.
Although feature squeezing generalizes to other domains,
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Fig. 1: Feature-squeezing framework for detecting adversarial
examples. The model is evaluated on both the original input and the input
after being pre-processed by feature squeezers. If the difference between the
model’s prediction on a squeezed input and its prediction on the original input
exceeds a threshold level, the input is identified to be adversarial.
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here we focus on image classification. Because it is the domain
where adversarial examples have been most extensively stud-
ied. We explore two simple methods for squeezing features of
images: reducing the color depth of each pixel in an image
and using spatial smoothing to reduce the differences among
individual pixels. We demonstrate that feature squeezing sig-
nificantly enhances the robustness of a model by predicting
correct labels of non-adaptive adversarial examples, while
preserving the accuracy on legitimate inputs (Section 4), thus
enabling an accurate detector for static adversarial examples
(Section 5). Feature squeezing appears to be both more accu-
rate and general, and less expensive, than previous methods,
though the robustness against adaptive adversary needs further
investigation in the future work.
Contributions. Our key contribution is introducing and evalu-
ating feature squeezing as a technique for detecting adversarial
examples. We show how the general detection framework
(Figure 1) can be instantiated to accurately detect adversarial
examples generated by several state-of-the-art methods. We
study two instances of feature squeezing: reducing color bit
depth (Section 3-A) and both local and non-local spatial
smoothing (Section 3-B). We report on experiments that show
feature squeezing helps DNN models predict correct classifi-
cation on adversarial examples generated by eleven different
and state-of-the-art attacks mounted without knowledge of
the defense (Section 4). Feature squeezing is complementary
to other adversarial defenses since it does not change the
underlying model, and can readily be composed with other
defenses such as adversarial training (Section 4-B).
Section 5 explains how we use feature squeezing for detect-
ing static adversarial inputs, combining multiple squeezers in
a joint detection framework. Our experiments show that joint-
detection can successfully detect adversarial examples from
eleven static attacks at the detection rates of 98% on MNIST
and 85% on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, with low (around 5%)
false positive rates. Although we cannot guarantee an adaptive
attacker cannot succeed against a particular feature squeezing
configuration, our results show it is effective against state-of-
the-art static methods, and it considerably complicates the task
of an adaptive adversary even with full knowledge of the model
and defense (Section 5-D).
2. Background
This section provides a brief introduction to neural net-
works, adversarial examples, and previous defenses.
A. Neural Networks
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) can efficiently learn highly-
accurate models from large corpora of training samples
in many domains [18, 26]. Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs), popularized by LeCun et al. [20], perform exception-
ally well on image classification. A deep CNN can be written
as a function g : X → Y , where X represents the input space
and Y is the output space representing a categorical set. For a
sample, x ∈ X, g(x) = fL( fL−1(. . . (( f1(x)))). Each fi represents
a layer. The last output layer, fL, creates the mapping from
a hidden space to the output space (class labels) through a
softmax function that outputs a vector of real numbers in
the range [0, 1] that add up to 1. We can treat the output of
softmax function as the probability distribution of input x over
C different possible output classes.
A training set contains N labeled inputs where the ith input
is denoted (xi, yi). When training a deep model, parameters re-
lated to each layer are randomly initialized, and input samples,
(xi, yi), are fed through the network. The output of this network
is a prediction g(xi) associated with the ith sample. To train the
DNN, the difference between prediction output, g(xi), and its
true label, yi, usually modeled with a loss function J(g(xi), yi),
is pushed backward into the network using a back-propagation
algorithm to update DNN parameters.
B. Generating Adversarial Examples
An adversarial example is an input crafted by an adversary
with the goal of producing an incorrect output from a target
classifier. Since ground truth, at least for image classification
tasks, is based on human perception which is hard to model
or test, research in adversarial examples typically defines an
adversarial example as a misclassified sample x′ generated by
perturbing a correctly-classified sample x (the seed example)
by some limited amount.
Adversarial examples can be targeted, in which case the
adversary’s goal is for x′ to be classified as a particular class
t, or untargeted, in which case the adversary’s goal is just for
x′ to be classified as any class other than its correct class.
More formally, given x ∈ X and g(·), the goal of an targeted
adversary with target t ∈ Y is to find an x′ ∈ X such that
g(x′) = t ∧ ∆(x, x′) ≤  (1)
where ∆(x, x′) represents the difference between input x and
x′. An untargeted adversary seeks to find an x′ ∈ X such that
g(x′) , g(x) ∧ ∆(x, x′) ≤ . (2)
The strength of the adversary, , limits the permissible transfor-
mations. The distance metric, ∆(·), and the adversarial strength
threshold, , are meant to model how close an adversarial
example needs to be to the original to “fool” a human observer.
Several techniques have been proposed to find adversar-
ial examples. Szegedy et al. [40] first observed that DNN
models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbation and used
the Limited-memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (L-
BFGS) algorithm to find adversarial examples. Their study also
found that adversarial perturbations generated from one DNN
model can also force other DNN models to produce incorrect
outputs. Subsequent papers have explored other strategies to
generate adversarial manipulations, including using the linear
assumption behind a model [10, 28], saliency maps [34], and
evolutionary algorithms [29].
Equations (1) and (2) suggest two different parameters
for categorizing methods for finding adversarial examples:
whether they are targeted or untargeted, and the choice of
∆(·), which is typically an Lp-norm distance metric. Popular
adversarial methods used the following three norms for ∆(·):
• L∞: ||z||∞ = max
i
|zi|.
The L∞ norm measures the maximum change in any dimen-
sion. This means an L∞ attack is limited by the maximum
change it can make to each pixel, but can alter all the pixels
in the image by up to that amount.
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Fig. 2: Image examples with bit depth reduction. The first
column shows images from MNIST, CIFAR-10 and Ima-
geNet, respectively. Other columns show squeezed versions
at different color-bit depths, ranging from 8 (original) to 1.
Original
Median 
Smoothing
Binary
Filter
Legitimate   FGSM       BIM        C/W Li    C/W L2     C/W L0     JSMA
Fig. 3: Examples of adversarial attacks and feature squeezing
methods extracted from the MNIST dataset. The first column
shows the original image and its squeezed versions, while the
other columns present the adversarial variants. All targeted
attacks are targeted-next.
• L2: ||z||2 =
√∑
i
z2i .
The L2 norm corresponds to the Euclidean distance between
x and x′. This distance can remain small when many small
changes are applied to many pixels.
• L0: ||z||0 = # {i | zi , 0}.
For images, this metric the total number of pixels that
may be altered between x and x′, but not the amount of
perturbation.
Here z = x − x′. Next, we discuss the eleven attacking
algorithms used in our experiments, grouped by the norm they
used for ∆(·).
1) Fast Gradient Sign Method: FGSM (L∞, Untargeted)
Goodfellow et al. hypothesized that DNNs are vulnerable
to adversarial perturbations because of their linear nature [10].
They proposed the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) for
efficiently finding adversarial examples. To control the cost
of attacking, FGSM assumes that the attack strength at every
feature dimension is the same, essentially measuring the pertur-
bation ∆(x, x′) using the L∞-norm. The strength of perturbation
at every dimension is limited by the same constant parameter,
, which is also used as the amount of perturbation.
As an untargeted attack, the perturbation is calculated
directly by using gradient vector of a loss function:
∆(x, x′) =  · sign(∇xJ(g(x), y)) (3)
Here the loss function, J(·, ·), is the loss that have been used
for training the specific DNN model, and y is the correct
label for x. Equation (3) essentially increases the loss J(·, ·)
by perturbing the input x based on a transformed gradient.
2) Basic Iterative Method: BIM (L∞, Untargeted)
Kurakin et al. extended the FGSM method by applying it
multiple times with small step size [19]. This method clips
pixel values of intermediate results after each step to ensure
that they are in an -neighborhood of the original image x. For
the mth iteration,
x′m+1 = x
′
m + Clipx,(α · sign(∇xJ(g(x′m), y))) (4)
The clipping equation, Clipx,(z), performs per-pixel clipping
on z so the result will be in the L∞ -neighborhood of x [19].
3) DeepFool (L2, Untargeted)
Moosavi et al. used a L2 minimization-based formulation,
termed DeepFool, to search for adversarial examples [28]:
∆(x, x′) := arg minz||z||2, subject to: g(x + z) , g(x) (5)
DeepFool searches for the minimal perturbation to fool a clas-
sifier and uses concepts from geometry to direct the search. For
linear classifiers (whose decision boundaries are linear planes),
the region of the space describing a classifier’s output can
be represented by a polyhedron (whose plane faces are those
boundary planes defined by the classifier). Then DeepFool
searches within this polyhedron for the minimal perturbation
that can change the classifiers decision. For general non-
linear classifiers, this algorithm uses an iterative linearization
procedure to get an approximated polyhedron.
4) Jacobian Saliency Map Approach: JSMA (L0, Targeted)
Papernot et al. [34] proposed the Jacobian-based saliency
map approach (JSMA) to search for adversarial examples
by only modifying a limited number of input pixels in an
image. As a targeted attack, JSMA iteratively perturbs pixels
in an input image that have high adversarial saliency scores.
The adversarial saliency map is calculated from the Jacobian
(gradient) matrix ∇xg(x) of the DNN model g(x) at the current
input x. The (c, p)th component in Jacobian matrix ∇xg(x)
describes the derivative of output class c with respect to
feature pixel p. The adversarial saliency score of each pixel
is calculated to reflect how this pixel will increase the output
score of the target class t versus changing the score of all
other possible output classes. The process is repeated until
classification into the target class is achieved, or it reaches
the maximum number of perturbed pixels. Essentially, JSMA
optimizes Equation (2) by measuring perturbation ∆(x, x′)
through the L0-norm.
5) Carlini/Wagner Attacks (L2, L∞ and L0, Targeted)
Carlini and Wagner recently introduced three new gradient-
based attack algorithms that are more effective than all
previously-known methods in terms of the adversarial success
rates achieved with minimal perturbation amounts [7]. They
proposed three versions of attacks using L2, L∞, and L0 norms.
The CW2 attack formalizes the task of generating adver-
sarial examples as an optimization problem with two terms as
3
usual: the prediction objective and the distance term. However,
it makes the optimization easier to solve through several tech-
niques. The first is using the logits-based objective function
instead of the softmax-cross-entropy loss that is commonly
used in other optimization-based attacks. This makes it robust
against the defensive distillation method [36]. The second is
converting the target variable to the argtanh space to bypass
the box-constraint on the input, making it more flexible in
taking advantage of modern optimization solvers, such as
Adam. It also uses a binary search algorithm to select a
suitable coefficient that performs a good trade-off between the
prediction and the distance terms. These improvements enable
the CW2 attack to find adversarial examples with smaller
perturbations than previous attacks.
The CW∞ attack recognizes the fact that L∞ norm is hard
to optimize and only the maximum term is penalized. Thus,
it revises the objective into limiting perturbations to be less
than a threshold τ (initially 1, decreasing in each iteration).
The optimization reduces τ iteratively until no solution can
be found. Consequently, the resulting solution has all the
perturbations smaller than the specified τ.
The basic idea of the CW0 attack is to iteratively use CW2
to find the least important features and freeze them (so value
will never be changed) until the L2 attack fails with too many
features being frozen. As a result, only those features with
significant impact on the prediction are changed. This is the
opposite of JSMA, which iteratively selects the most important
features and performs large perturbations until it successfully
fools the target classifier.
C. Defensive Techniques
Papernot et al. [35] provided a comprehensive summary of
work on defending against adversarial samples, grouping work
into two broad categories: adversarial training and gradient
masking, which we discuss further below. A third approach
is to transform the input so that the model is not sensitive to
small perturbations. Our proposed feature squeezing method
is broadly part of this theme.
Adversarial Training. Adversarial training introduces dis-
covered adversarial examples and the corresponding ground
truth labels to the training [10, 40, 21]. Ideally, the model
will learn how to restore the ground truth from the adversarial
perturbations and perform robustly on the future adversarial
examples. This technique, however, suffers from the high
cost to generate adversarial examples and (at least) doubles
the training cost of DNN models due to its iterative re-
training procedure. Its effectiveness also depends on having
a technique for efficiently generating adversarial examples
similar to the one used by the adversary, which may not be
the case in practice. As pointed out by Papernot et al. [35],
it is essential to include adversarial examples produced by
all known attacks in adversarial training, since this defensive
training is non-adaptive. But, it is computationally expensive
to find adversarial inputs by most known techniques, and there
is no way to be confident the adversary is limited to techniques
that are known to the trainer.
Madry et al. proposed a variation of adversarial training
by enlarging the model capacity in the re-training. Their
adversarial training uses the adversarial examples generated by
BIM attack with random starts, named as the “PGD attack”
[21]. The authors claimed that this method could provide a
security guarantee against any adversary based on the theory
of robust optimization. The empirical results showed that
the PGD-based adversarial training significantly increases the
robustness of an MNIST model against many different attacks.
However, the result on the CIFAR-10 dataset is inferior. We
compare our feature squeezing technique with this adversarial
training in Section 4-B.
Gradient Masking. By forcing DNN models to produce near-
zero gradients, the “gradient masking” defenses seek to reduce
the sensitivity of DNN models to small changes in inputs. Gu
et al. proposed adding a gradient penalty term in the training
objective. The penalty term is a summation of the layer-by-
layer Frobenius norm of the Jacobian matrix [12]. Although
the trained model behaves more robust against adversaries,
the penalty significantly reduces the capacity of the model
and sacrifices accuracy on many tasks [35]. Papernot et al.
introduced the strategy of “defensive distillation” to harden
DNN models [36]. A defensively distilled model is trained
with the smoothed labels produced by an existing trained DNN
model. Then, to hide model’s gradient information from an
adversary, the distilled model replaces its last layer with a
“harder” softmax function after training. Experimental results
showed that larger perturbations are required when using
JSMA to evade distilled models. However, two subsequent
studies have found that defensive distillation failed to mitigate
a variant of JSMA with a division trick [6] and a black-box
attack [33]. Papernot et al. concluded that methods designed to
conceal gradient information are bound to have limited success
because of the transferability of adversarial examples [35].
Input Transformation. A few recent studies for hardening
deep learning try to reduce the model sensitivity to small
input changes by transforming the inputs. Bhagoji et al.
proposed to use dimensionality reduction techniques such as
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as defense [2]. They first
performed PCA on a clean dataset, then linearly projected all
the inputs to the PCA space and only preserved the top k
principle axes. While we could expect the reduced sensitivity
with the PCA projection, the method corrupts the spatial
structure of an image, and the state-of-the-art CNN models are
no longer applicable. Instead, Meng and Chen proposed to train
an autoencoder as an image filter to harden DNN models [24].
The encoder stage of the autoencoder is essentially a non-
linear dimensionality reduction. Its decoder stage restores an
input to its original spatial structure; therefore the target DNN
model does not need to change. Similar to ours, Osadchy et
al. independently suggested using the binary filter and the
median smoothing filter to eliminate adversarial perturbations
and proposed to attack the defenses by increasing attackers’
perturbation strength [31]. Differently, we focus on the task of
detecting adversarial examples and show that increasing the
perturbation amount may result in unrecognizable images in
Section 5-D.
D. Detecting Adversarial Examples
Multiple recent studies [25, 11, 9] focused on detecting
adversarial examples. The strategies they explored naturally
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fall into three groups: sample statistics, training a detector
and prediction inconsistency. Our proposed feature squeezing
belongs to the third group that employs prediction inconsis-
tency.
Sample Statistics. For detecting adversarial examples, Grosse
et al. [11] proposed a statistical test using maximum mean
discrepancy and suggests the energy distance as the statistical
distance measure. Their method requires a large set of both
adversarial and legitimate inputs and is not capable of detect-
ing individual adversarial examples, making it not useful in
practice. Feinman et al. proposed to use kernel density estima-
tion [9] that measures the distance between an unknown input
and a group of legitimate inputs using their representations
from some middle layers of a DNN model. It is computation-
ally expensive and can only detect adversarial examples lying
far from the manifolds of the legitimate population. Due to
the intrinsically unperceptive nature of adversarial examples,
using sample statistics to separate adversarial examples from
legitimate inputs seems unlikely to be effective. Experimental
results from both Grosse et al. [11] and Feinman et al. [9]
showed that strategies relying on sample statistics gave inferior
detection performance compared to other detection methods.
Training a Detector. Similar to adversarial training, ad-
versarial examples can be used to train a detector. However,
this strategy requires a large number of adversarial examples,
therefore, being expensive and prone to overfitting the adver-
sarial attacks that generated examples for training the detector.
Metzen et al. proposed attaching a CNN-based detector as a
branch off a middle layer of the original DNN model [25]. The
detector outputs two classes and uses adversarial examples (as
one class) plus legitimate examples (as the other class) for
training. The detector is trained while freezing the weights of
the original DNN, therefore does not sacrifice the classification
accuracy on the legitimate inputs. Grosse et al. demonstrated a
detection method (previously proposed by Nguyen et al. [29])
that adds a new “adversarial” class in the last layer of the DNN
model [11]. The revised model is trained with both legitimate
and adversarial inputs, reducing the accuracy on legitimate
inputs due to the change to the model architecture.
Prediction Inconsistency. The basic idea of prediction incon-
sistency is to measure the disagreement among several models
in predicting an unknown input, since one adversarial example
may not fool every DNN model. Feinman et al. borrowed an
idea from dropout [14] and designed a detection technique they
called Bayesian neural network uncertainty [9]. The authors
used the “training” mode of dropout layers to generate many
predictions for an input at test time. They reported that the
disagreement among the predictions of sub-models is rare on
legitimate inputs but common on adversarial examples, thus
can be used for detection. Meng and Chen independently
proposed a similar adversary detection method to ours that
also uses the prediction vectors of the original and the filtered
images [24]. The biggest difference is that they trained an auto-
encoder as the image filter, whereas we rely on “hard-coded”
transformations. As a result, our approach is less expensive
in the training phase. We compare the performance of their
detectors with ours in Table 5.
3. Feature Squeezing Methods
Although the notion of feature squeezing is quite general,
we focus on two simple types of squeezing: reducing the
color depth of images (Section 3-A), and using smoothing
(both local and non-local) to reduce the variation among
pixels (Section 3-B). Section 4 looks at the impact of each
squeezing method on classifier accuracy and robustness against
adversarial inputs. These results enable feature squeezing to be
used for detecting adversarial examples in Section 5.
A. Color Depth
A neural network, as a differentiable model, assumes that
the input space is continuous. However, digital computers only
support discrete representations as approximations of contin-
uous natural data. A standard digital image is represented by
an array of pixels, each of which is usually represented as a
number that represents a specific color.
Common image representations use color bit depths that
lead to irrelevant features, so we hypothesize that reducing
bit depth can reduce adversarial opportunity without harming
classifier accuracy. Two common representations, which we
focus on here because of their use in our test datasets, are 8-
bit grayscale and 24-bit color. A grayscale image provides 28 =
256 possible values for each pixel. An 8-bit value represents
the intensity of a pixel where 0 is black, 255 is white, and
intermediate numbers represent different shades of gray. The 8-
bit scale can be extended to display color images with separate
red, green and blue color channels. This provides 24 bits for
each pixel, representing 224 ≈ 16 million different colors.
1) Squeezing Color Bits
While people usually prefer larger bit depth as it makes the
displayed image closer to the natural image, large color depths
are often not necessary for interpreting images (for example,
people have no problem recognizing most black-and-white
images). We investigate the bit depth squeezing with three
popular datasets for image classification: MNIST, CIFAR-10
and ImageNet.
Greyscale Images (MNIST). The MNIST dataset contains
70,000 images of hand-written digits (0 to 9). Of these, 60,000
images are used as training data and the remaining 10,000
images are used for testing. Each image is 28× 28 pixels, and
each pixel is encoded as 8-bit grayscale.
Figure 2 shows one example of class 0 in the MNIST
dataset in the first row, with the original 8-bit grayscale
images in the leftmost and the 1-bit monochrome images
rightmost. The rightmost images, generated by applying a
binary filter with 0.5 as the cutoff, appear nearly identical to
the original images on the far left. The processed images are
still recognizable to humans, even though the feature space is
only 1/128th the size of the original 8-bit grayscale space.
Figure 3 hints at why reducing color depth can mitigate
adversarial examples generated by multiple attack techniques.
The top row shows one original example of class 1 from the
MNIST test set and six different adversarial examples. The
middle row shows those examples after reducing the bit depth
of each pixel into binary. To a human eye, the binary-filtered
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images look more like the correct class; in our experiments, we
find this is true for DNN classifiers also (Table 3 in Section 4).
Color Images (CIFAR-10 and ImageNet). We use two
datasets of color images in this paper: the CIFAR-10 dataset
with tiny images and the ImageNet dataset with high-resolution
photographs. The CIFAR-10 dataset contains 60,000 images,
each with 32 × 32 pixels encoded with 24-bit color and
belonging to 10 different classes. The ImageNet dataset is pro-
vided by ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge
2012 for the classification task, which contains 1.2 million
training images and the other 50,000 images for validation.
The photographs in the ImageNet dataset are in different sizes
and hand-labeled with 1,000 classes. However, they are pre-
processed to 224×224 pixels encoded with 24-bit True Color
for the target model MobileNet [16, 23] we use in this paper.
The middle row and the bottom row of Figure 2 show that
we can reduce the original 8-bit (per RGB channel) images to
fewer bits without significantly decreasing the image recogniz-
ability to humans. It is difficult to tell the difference between
the original images with 8-bit per channel color and images
using as few as 4 bits of color depth. Unlike what we observed
in the MNIST datase, however, bit depths lower than 4 do
introduce some human-observable loss. This is because we
lose much more information in the color image even though we
reduce to the same number of bits per channel. For example, if
we reduce the bits-per-channel from 8 bits to 1 bit, the resulting
grayscale space is 1/128 large as the original; the resulting
RGB space is only 2−(24−3) = 1/2, 097, 152 of the original
size. Nevertheless, in Section 4-A we find that squeezing to 4
bits is strong enough to mitigate a lot of adversarial examples
while preserving the accuracy on legitimate examples.
2) Implementation
We implement the bit depth reduction operation in Python
with the NumPy library. The input and output are in the same
numerical scale [0, 1] so that we don’t need to change anything
of the target models. For reducing to i-bit depth (1 ≤ i ≤ 7),
we first multiply the input value with 2i−1 (minus 1 due to the
zero value) then round to integers. Next we scale the integers
back to [0, 1], divided by 2i − 1. The information capacity
of the representation is reduced from 8-bit to i-bit with the
integer-rounding operation.
B. Spatial Smoothing
Spatial smoothing (also known as blur) is a group of
techniques widely used in image processing for reducing image
noise. Next, we describe the two types of spatial smoothing
methods we used: local smoothing and non-local smoothing.
1) Local Smoothing
Local smoothing methods make use of the nearby pixels
to smooth each pixel. By selecting different mechanisms in
weighting the neighbouring pixels, a local smoothing method
can be designed as Gaussian smoothing, mean smoothing or
the median smoothing method [38] we use. As we report in
Section 4-A, median smoothing (also known as median blur or
median filter) is particularly effective in mitigating adversarial
examples generated by L0 attacks.
The median filter runs a sliding window over each pixel of
the image, where the center pixel is replaced by the median
value of the neighboring pixels within the window. It does
not actually reduce the number of pixels in the image, but
spreads pixel values across nearby pixels. The median filter
is essentially squeezing features out of the sample by making
adjacent pixels more similar.
The size of the window is a configurable parameter, ranging
from 1 up to the image size. If it were set to the image size,
it would (modulo edge effects) flatten the entire image to one
color. A square shape window is often used in median filter-
ing, though there are other design choices. Several padding
methods can be employed for the pixels on the edge, since
there are no real pixels to fill the window. We choose reflect
padding , in which we mirror the image along with the edge
for calculating the median value of a window when necessary.
Median smoothing is particularly effective at removing
sparsely-occurring black and white pixels in an image (de-
scriptively known as salt-and-pepper noise), whilst preserving
edges of objects well.
Implementation. We use the median filter implemented in
SciPy [38]. In a 2×2 sliding window, the center pixel is always
located in the lower right. When there are two equal-median
values due to the even number of pixels in a window, we
(arbitrarily) use the greater value as the median.
2) Non-local Smoothing
Non-local smoothing is different from local smoothing
because it smooths over similar pixels in a much larger area
instead of just nearby pixels. For a given image patch, non-
local smoothing finds several similar patches in a large area
of the image and replaces the center patch with the average of
those similar patches. Assuming that the mean of the noise is
zero, averaging the similar patches will cancel out the noise
while preserving the edges of an object. Similar with local
smoothing, there are several possible ways to weigh the similar
patches in the averaging operation, such as Gaussian, mean,
and median. We use a variant of the Gaussian kernel because
it is widely used and allows to control the deviation from
the mean. The parameters of a non-local smoothing method
typically include the search window size (a large area for
searching similar patches), the patch size and the filter strength
(bandwidth of the Gaussian kernel). We will denote a filter as
“non-local means (a-b-c)” where “a” means the search window
a × a, “b” means the patch size b × b and “c” means the filter
strength.
Implementation. We use the fast non-local means denoising
method implemented in OpenCV [30]. It first converts a color
image to the CIELAB colorspace, then separately denoises its
L and AB components, then converts back to the RGB space.
C. Other Squeezing Methods
Our results in this paper are limited to these simple
squeezing methods, which are surprisingly effective on our test
datasets. However, we believe many other squeezing methods
are possible, and continued experimentation will be worthwhile
to find the most effective squeezing methods.
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One possible area to explore includes lossy compression
techniques. Kurakin et al. explored the effectiveness of the
JPEG format in mitigating the adversarial examples [19]. Their
experiment shows that a very low JPEG quality (e.g. 10 out of
100) is able to destruct the adversarial perturbations generated
by FGSM with =16 (at scale of [0,255]) for at most 30%
of the successful adversarial examples. However, they didn’t
evaluate the potential loss on the accuracy of legitimate inputs.
Another possible direction is dimension reduction. For
example, Turk and Pentland’s early work pointed out that many
pixels are irrelevant features in the face recognition tasks, and
the face images can be projected to a feature space named
eigenfaces [41]. Even though image samples represented in the
eigenface-space loose the spatial information a CNN model
needs, the image restoration through eigenfaces may be a
useful technique to mitigate adversarial perturbations in a face
recognition task.
4. Robustness
The previous section suggested that images, as used in
classification tasks, contain many irrelevant features that can
be squeezed without reducing recognizability. For feature
squeezing to be effective in detecting adversarial examples
(Figure 1), it must satisfy two properties: (1) on adversarial
examples, the squeezing reverses the effects of the adversarial
perturbations; and (2) on legitimate examples, the squeezing
does not significantly impact a classifier’s predictions. This
section evaluates the how well different feature squeezing
methods achieve these properties.
Threat model. In evaluating robustness, we assume a pow-
erful adversary who has full access to a trained target model,
but no ability to influence that model. For now, we assume the
adversary is not aware of feature squeezing being performed on
the operator’s side. The adversary tries to find inputs that are
misclassified by the model using white-box attack techniques.
Although we analyze the robustness of standalone feature
squeezers here, we do not propose using a standalone squeezer
as a defense because an adversary may take advantage of
feature squeezing in attacking a DNN model. For example,
when facing binary squeezing, an adversary can construct an
image by setting all pixel intensity values to be near 0.5. This
image is entirely gray to human eyes. By setting pixel values
to either 0.49 or 0.51 it can result in an arbitrary 1-bit filtered
image after squeezing, either entirely white or black. Such
an attack can easily be detected by our detection framework
(Section 5), however. Section 5-D considers how adversaries
can adapt to our detection framework.
Target Models. We use three popular datasets for the image
classification task: MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet. For each
dataset, we set up a pre-trained model with the state-of-the-art
performance. Table 1 summarizes the prediction performance
of each model and its DNN architecture. Our MNIST model (a
seven-layer CNN [4]) and CIFAR-10 model (a DenseNet [17,
22] model) both achieve prediction performance competitive
with state-of-the-art results [1]. For the ImageNet dataset, we
use a MobileNet model [16, 23] because MobileNets are more
widely used on mobile phones and their small and efficient
design make it easier to conduct experiments. The accuracy
TABLE 1: Summary of the target DNN models.
Dataset Model Top-1
Accuracy
Top-1 Mean
Confidence
Top-5
Accuracy
MNIST 7-Layer CNN [4] 99.43% 99.39% -
CIFAR-10 DenseNet [17, 22] 94.84% 92.15% -
ImageNet MobileNet [16, 23] 68.36% 75.48% 88.25%
TABLE 2: Evaluation of attacks.
Configration Cost (s) SuccessRate
Prediction
Confidence
Distortion
Attack Mode L∞ L2 L0
M
N
IS
T
L∞
FGSM 0.002 46% 93.89% 0.302 5.905 0.560
BIM 0.01 91% 99.62% 0.302 4.758 0.513
CW∞
Next 51.2 100% 99.99% 0.251 4.091 0.491
LL 50.0 100% 99.98% 0.278 4.620 0.506
L2 CW2
Next 0.3 99% 99.23% 0.656 2.866 0.440
LL 0.4 100% 99.99% 0.734 3.218 0.436
L0
CW0
Next 68.8 100% 99.99% 0.996 4.538 0.047
LL 74.5 100% 99.99% 0.996 5.106 0.060
JSMA Next 0.8 71% 74.52% 1.000 4.328 0.047LL 1.0 48% 74.80% 1.000 4.565 0.053
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
L∞
FGSM 0.02 85% 84.85% 0.016 0.863 0.997
BIM 0.2 92% 95.29% 0.008 0.368 0.993
CW∞
Next 225 100% 98.22% 0.012 0.446 0.990
LL 225 100% 97.79% 0.014 0.527 0.995
L2
DeepFool 0.4 98% 73.45% 0.028 0.235 0.995
CW2
Next 10.4 100% 97.90% 0.034 0.288 0.768
LL 12.0 100% 97.35% 0.042 0.358 0.855
L0
CW0
Next 367 100% 98.19% 0.650 2.103 0.019
LL 426 100% 97.60% 0.712 2.530 0.024
JSMA Next 8.4 100% 43.29% 0.896 4.954 0.079LL 13.6 98% 39.75% 0.904 5.488 0.098
Im
ag
eN
et
L∞
FGSM 0.02 99% 63.99% 0.008 3.009 0.994
BIM 0.2 100% 99.71% 0.004 1.406 0.984
CW∞
Next 211 99% 90.33% 0.006 1.312 0.850
LL 269 99% 81.42% 0.010 1.909 0.952
L2
DeepFool 60.2 89% 79.59% 0.027 0.726 0.984
CW2
Next 20.6 90% 76.25% 0.019 0.666 0.323
LL 29.1 97% 76.03% 0.031 1.027 0.543
L0 CW0
Next 608 100% 91.78% 0.898 6.825 0.003
LL 979 100% 80.67% 0.920 9.082 0.005
Results are for 100 seed images for each the DNN models described in
Table 1. The cost of an attack generating adversarial examples is measured
in seconds per sample. The L0 distortion is normalized by the number of
pixels (e.g., 0.560 means 56% of all pixels in the image are modified).
achieved by this model (88.25% top-5 accuracy), is below what
can be achieved with a larger model such as Inception v3 [39,
8] (93.03% top-5 accuracy).
Attacks. We evaluate feature squeezing on all of the attacks
described in Section 2-C and summarized in Table 2. For each
targeted attack, we try two different targets: the Next class
(t = L + 1 mod #classes), and the least-likely class (LL),
t = min (yˆ). Here t is the target class, L is the index of the
ground-truth class and yˆ is the prediction vector of an input
image. This gives eleven total attacks: the three untargeted
attacks (FGSM, BIM and DeepFool), and two versions each
of the four targeted attacks (JSMA, CW∞, CW2, and CW0). We
use the implementations of FGSM, BIM and JSMA provided
by the Cleverhans library [32]. For DeepFool and the three
CW attacks, we use the implementations from the original
authors [4, 27]. Our models and code for our attacks, defenses,
and tests are available at https://evadeML.org/zoo. We use a
PC equipped with an i7-6850K 3.60GHz CPU, 64GiB system
memory, and a GeForce GTX 1080 to conduct the experiments.
For the seed images, we select the first 100 correctly pre-
dicted examples in the test (or validation) set from each dataset
for all the attack methods, since some attacks are too expensive
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TABLE 3: Model accuracy with feature squeezing
Dataset
Squeezer L∞ Attacks L2 Attacks L0 Attacks All
Attacks LegitimateName Parameters FGSM BIM CW∞
Deep-
Fool
CW2 CW0 JSMA
Next LL Next LL Next LL Next LL
MNIST
None 54% 9% 0% 0% - 0% 0% 0% 0% 27% 40% 13.00% 99.43%
Bit Depth 1-bit 92% 87% 100% 100% - 83% 66% 0% 0% 50% 49% 62.70% 99.33%
Median Smoothing 2x2 61% 16% 70% 55% - 51% 35% 39% 36% 62% 56% 48.10% 99.28%3x3 59% 14% 43% 46% - 51% 53% 67% 59% 82% 79% 55.30% 98.95%
CIFAR-10
None 15% 8% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2.27% 94.84%
Bit Depth 5-bit 17% 13% 12% 19% 40% 40% 47% 0% 0% 21% 17% 20.55% 94.55%4-bit 21% 29% 69% 74% 72% 84% 84% 7% 10% 23% 20% 44.82% 93.11%
Median Smoothing 2x2 38% 56% 84% 86% 83% 87% 83% 88% 85% 84% 76% 77.27% 89.29%
Non-local Means 11-3-4 27% 46% 80% 84% 76% 84% 88% 11% 11% 44% 32% 53.00% 91.18%
ImageNet
None 1% 0% 0% 0% 11% 10% 3% 0% 0% - - 2.78% 69.70%
Bit Depth 4-bit 5% 4% 66% 79% 44% 84% 82% 38% 67% - - 52.11% 68.00%5-bit 2% 0% 33% 60% 21% 68% 66% 7% 18% - - 30.56% 69.40%
Median Smoothing 2x2 22% 28% 75% 81% 72% 81% 84% 85% 85% - - 68.11% 65.40%3x3 33% 41% 73% 76% 66% 77% 79% 81% 79% - - 67.22% 62.10%
Non-local Means 11-3-4 10% 25% 77% 82% 57% 87% 86% 43% 47% - - 57.11% 65.40%
No results are shown for DeepFool on MNIST because of the adversarial examples it generates appear unrecognizable to humans; no results
are shown for JSMA on ImageNet because it requires more memory than available to run. We do not apply the non-local smoothing on
MNIST images because it is difficult to find similar patches on such images for smoothing a center patch.
to run on all the seeds. We adjust the applicable parameters of
each attack to generate high-confidence adversarial examples,
otherwise they would be easily rejected. This is because the
three DNN models we use achieve high confidence of the
top-1 predictions on legitimate examples (see Table 1; mean
confidence is over 99% for MNIST, 92% for CIFAR-10, and
75% for ImageNet). In addition, all the pixel values in the
generated adversarial images are clipped and squeezed to 8-
bit-per-channel pixels so that the resulting inputs are within
the possible space of images.
Table 2 reports results from our evaluation of the eleven
attacks on three datasets. The success rate captures the proba-
bility an adversary achieves their goal. For untargeted attacks,
the reported success rate is 1−accuracy; for targeted attacks, it
is only considered a success if the model predicts the targeted
class. Most of the attacks are very effective in generating high-
confidence adversarial examples against three DNN models.
The CW attacks often produce smaller distortions than other
attacks using the same norm objective, but are much more
expensive to generate. On the other hand, FGSM, DeepFool,
and JSMA often produce low-confidence adversarial examples.
We exclude the DeepFool attack from the MNIST dataset
because it generates images that appear unrecognizable to
humans.1 We do not have JSMA results for ImageNet because
our 64GiB test machine runs out of memory.
A. Results
Table 3 summarizes the effectiveness of different feature
squeezers on classification accuracy in our experiments.
Color Depth Reduction. The resolution of a specific bit
depth is defined as the number of possible values for each
pixel. For example, the resolution of 8-bit color depth is 256.
Reducing the bit depth lowers the resolution and diminishes
1We believe this is because the linear boundary assumption doesn’t hold for
the particular MNIST model and DeepFool fails to approximate the minimal
perturbation.
the opportunity an adversary has to find effective perturbations.
MNIST. The last column of Table 3 shows the binary filter
(1-bit depth reduction) barely reduces the accuracy on the
legitimate examples of MNIST (from 99.43% to 99.33% on
the test set). The binary filter is effective on all the L2 and
L∞ attacks. For example, it improves the accuracy on CW∞
adversarial examples from 0% to 100%. The binary filter works
well even for large L∞ distortions. This is because the binary
filter squeezes each pixel into 0 or 1 using a cutoff 0.5 in the
[0, 1) scale. This means maliciously perturbing a pixel’s value
by ±0.30 does not change the squeezed value of pixels whose
original values fall into [0, .20) and [.80, 1). In contrast, bit
depth reduction is not effective against L0 attacks (JSMA and
CW0) since these attacks make large changes to a few pixels
that are not reversed by the bit depth squeezer. However, as
we will show later, the spatial smoothing squeezers are often
effective against L0 attacks.
CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. Because the DNN models for
CIFAR-10 and ImageNet are more sensitive to perturbations,
adversarial examples at very low L2 and L∞ distortions can
be found. Table 3 includes the results of 4-bit depth and 5-
bit depth filters in mitigating the adversaries for CIFAR-10
and ImageNet. In testing, the 5-bit depth filter increases the
accuracy on adversarial inputs for several of the attacks (for
example, increasing accuracy from 0% to 40% for the CW2
Next class targeted attack), while almost perfectly preserv-
ing the accuracy on legitimate data (94.55% compared with
94.84%). The more aggressive 4-bit depth filter is more robust
against adversaries (e.g., accuracy on CW2 increases to 84%),
but reduces the accuracy on legitimate inputs from 94.84%
to 93.11%. We do not believe these results are good enough
for use as a stand-alone defense (even ignoring the risk of
adversarial adaptation), but they provide some insight why the
method is effective as used in our detection framework.
Median Smoothing. The adversarial perturbations produced
by the L0 attacks (JSMA and CW0) are similar to salt-and-
pepper noise, though it is introduced intentionally instead of
randomly. Note that the adversarial strength of an L0 adversary
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Fig. 4: Composing adversarial training with feature squeezing. The horizontal axis is the adversary’s strength (), increasing to the right. The
adversarial training uses  = 0.3 for both FGSM are PGD. Composing the 1-bit filter with the adversarial-trained model often performs the best.
limits the number of pixels that can be manipulated, so it is
not surprising that maximizing the amount of change to each
modified pixel is typically most useful to the adversary. This is
why the smoothing squeezers are more effective against these
attacks than the color depth squeezers.
MNIST. We evaluate two window sizes on the MNIST dataset
in Table 3. Median smoothing is the best squeezer for all
of the L0 attacks (CW0 and JSMA). The median filter with
2 × 2 window size performs slightly worse on adversarial
examples than the one with 3 × 3 window, but it almost
perfectly preserves the performance on the legitimate examples
(decreasing accuracy from 99.43% to 99.28%).
CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. The experiment confirms the in-
tuition that median smoothing can effectively eliminate the
L0-limited perturbations. Without squeezing, the L0 attacks
are effective on CIFAR-10, resulting in 0% accuracy for the
original model (”None” row in Table 3). However, with a 2×2
median filter, the accuracy increases to over 75% for all the
four L0 type attacks. We observe similar results on ImageNet,
where the accuracy increases from 0% to 85% for the CW0
attacks after median smoothing.
Non-local Smoothing. Non-local smoothing has comparable
performance in increasing the accuracy on adversarial exam-
ples other than the L0 type. On the other hand, it has little
impact on the accuracy on legitimate examples. For example,
the 2×2 median filter decreases the accuracy on the CIFAR-10
model from 94.84% to 89.29% while the model with non-local
smoothing still achieves 91.18%.
B. Combining with Adversarial Training
Since our approach modifies inputs rather than the model,
it can easily be composed with any defense technique that
operates on the model. The most successful previous de-
fense against adversarial examples is adversarial training (Sec-
tion 2-C). To evaluate the effectiveness of composing feature
squeezing with adversarial training, we combined it with
two different adversarial training methods: the FGSM-based
version implemented in Cleverhans [32] and the PGD-based
version implemented by Madry et al. [21]. We evaluated the
accuracy on all 10,000 MNIST testing images and compared
the three different configurations: 1. the base model with a bi-
nary filter; 2. the adversarial-trained model; 3. the adversarial-
trained model with a binary filter.
Figure 4a shows that bit-depth reduction by itself often
outperforms the adversarial training methods, and the compo-
sition is nearly always the most effective. For FGSM, binary
filter feature squeezing outperforms adversarial training for
 values ranging from 0.1 to 0.3. This is the best case for
adversarial training since the adversarially-trained model is
learning from the same exact adversarial method (training is
done with FGSM examples generated at  = 0.3) as the one
used to produce adversarial examples in the test. Nevertheless,
feature squeezing outperforms it, even at  = 0.3 (93.03%
accuracy on adversarial examples compared to 92.38%).
PGD-based adversarial training [21] does better, outper-
forming the simple binary filter feature squeezing for  = 0.2
and 0.3 but slightly reducing accuracy on legitimate ( = 0)
examples, as shown in Figure 4b. Composing both methods
typically leads to the highest accuracy or the one comparable to
the best single approach. For example, both methods encounter
significant drop on accuracy when  = 0.4: 87.60% with the
binary filter and 14.84% with adversarial training. However,
the composed method still achieves 94.21%.
Feature squeezing is far less expensive than adversarial
training. It is almost cost-free, as we simply insert a binary
filter before the pre-trained MNIST model. On the other
hand, adversarial training is very expensive as it requires both
generating adversarial examples and retraining the classifier
for many epochs. When its cost is not prohibitive, though,
adversarial training is still beneficial since it can be combined
with feature squeezing.
5. Detecting Adversarial Inputs
The results from Section 4 show that feature squeezing
is capable of obtaining accurate model predictions for many
adversarial examples with little reduction in accuracy for le-
gitimate examples. This enables detection of adversarial inputs
using the framework introduced in Figure 1. The basic idea is
to compare the model’s prediction on the original sample with
the same model’s prediction on the sample after squeezing. The
model’s predictions for a legitimate example and its squeezed
version should be similar. On the contrary, if the original and
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Fig. 5: Differences in L1 distance between original and squeezed sample, for legitimate and adversarial examples across three
datasets. The L1 score has a range from 0.0 to 2.0 . Each curve is fitted over 200 histogram bins each representing the L1 distance
range of 0.01. Each sample is counted in the bin for the maximum L1 distance between the original prediction and the output
of the best joint-detection squeezing configuration shown in Table 4. The curves for adversarial examples are for all adversarial
examples, including unsuccessful ones (so the separation for successful ones is even larger than shown here).
squeezed examples result in dramatically different predictions,
the input is likely to be adversarial. Figure 5 confirms this
intuition visually by comparing the L1 distances between
the predictions for squeezed and non-squeezed examples for
legitimate and adversarial examples, and Table 4 shows the
results of our experiments. The following subsections provide
more details on our detection method, experimental setup, and
discuss the results. Section 5-D considers how adversaries may
adapt to our defense.
A. Detection Method
A prediction vector generated by a DNN classifier normally
represents the probability distribution how likely an input
sample is to belong to each possible class. Hence, comparing
the model’s original prediction with the prediction on the
squeezed sample involves comparing two probability distri-
bution vectors. There are many possible ways to compare the
probability distributions, such as the L1 norm, the L2 norm and
K-L divergence [3]. For this work, we select the L1 norm2
as a natural measure of the difference between the original
prediction vector and the squeezed prediction:
score(x,xsqueezed) = ‖g(x) − g(xsqueezed)‖1 (6)
Here g(x) is the output vector of a DNN model produced by
the softmax layer whose ith entry describes the probability how
likely input x is in the ith class. The L1 score has a range from
0 to 2 for the prediction vectors. Higher scores mean there
are greater differences between the original prediction and
the squeezed prediction. The maximum value of 2 is reached
when each prediction vector consists of a 1 and all zeros, but
with different classes as the 1. Based on the accuracy results
in Section 4, we expect the score to be small for legitimate
inputs and large for adversarial examples. The effectiveness of
detection depends on selecting a threshold value that accurately
distinguishes between legitimate and adversarial inputs.
Even though we can select an effective feature squeezer
for a specific type of adversarial method, an operator typically
does not know the exact attack method that would be used
in practice. Hence, we combine multiple feature squeezers for
2This turned out to work well, but it is certainly worth exploring in future
work if other metrics can work better.
detection by outputting the maximum distance:
scorejoint = max
(
score(x,xsq1), score(x,xsq2), . . .
)
(7)
We chose the max operator based on the assumption that
different squeezers will be effective for different types of
perturbations, and that the effective squeezer can be identified
through the highest L1 score. On the other hand, this may
increase the false positive rate because the max operator also
selects the most destructive squeezer on legitimate inputs. We
found that using max is enough to allow a reasonable trade-off
in the empirical results, but it may be worthwhile to investigate
better ways to combine the squeezers in future work.
Figure 5 shows the histogram of scorejoint for both le-
gitimate (blue) and adversarial examples (red) on the three
datasets. The peak for legitimate examples is always near 0,
and the peak for adversarial examples is always near 2. Picking
a threshold value between the two peaks is a balance between
high detection rates and acceptable false positive rates.
B. Experimental Setup
We report on experiments using all attacks from Section 4
with the three types of squeezers in different configurations.
Datasets. To get a balanced dataset for detection, we select
the same number of legitimate examples from the test (or
validation) set of each dataset. For each of the attacks in
Section 4, we use the 100 adversarial examples generated for
each attack in the robustness experiments. This results in 2,000
total examples for MNIST (of which 1,000 are legitimate ex-
amples, and 1,000 are adversarial), 2,200 examples for CIFAR-
10 and 1,800 examples for ImageNet. We randomly split each
detection dataset into two groups: one-half for training the
detector and the remainder for validation. Note that some of
the adversarial examples are failed adversarial examples which
do not confuse the original model, so the number of successful
adversarial examples varies slightly across the attacks.
Squeezers. We first evaluate how well each squeezing config-
uration does against adversarial examples generated by each
attack method. Then, we consider the realistic scenario where
the defender does not know that attack method used by the
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TABLE 4: Detection rate for squeezing configurations on successful adversarial examples.
Configuration L∞ Attacks L2 Attacks L0 Attacks Overall
Detection
RateSqueezer Parameters Threshold FGSM BIM
CW∞ Deep
Fool
CW2 CW0 JSMA
Next LL Next LL Next LL Next LL
M
N
IS
T
Bit Depth 1-bit 0.0005 1.000 0.979 1.000 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 0.556 0.563 1.000 1.000 0.9032-bit 0.0002 0.615 0.064 0.615 0.755 - 0.963 0.958 0.378 0.396 0.969 1.000 0.656
Median Smoothing 2x2 0.0029 0.731 0.277 1.000 1.000 - 0.944 1.000 0.822 0.938 0.938 1.000 0.8683x3 0.0390 0.385 0.106 0.808 0.830 - 0.815 0.958 0.889 1.000 0.969 1.000 0.781
Best Attack-Specific Single Squeezer - 1.000 0.979 1.000 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 0.889 1.000 1.000 1.000 -
Best Joint Detection (1-bit, 2x2) 0.0029 1.000 0.979 1.000 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 0.911 0.938 1.000 1.000 0.982
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
Bit Depth
1-bit 1.9997 0.063 0.075 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013
2-bit 1.9967 0.083 0.175 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.022
3-bit 1.7822 0.125 0.250 0.755 0.977 0.170 0.787 0.939 0.365 0.214 0.000 0.000 0.409
4-bit 0.7930 0.125 0.150 0.811 0.886 0.642 0.936 0.980 0.192 0.179 0.041 0.000 0.446
5-bit 0.3301 0.000 0.050 0.377 0.636 0.509 0.809 0.878 0.096 0.018 0.041 0.038 0.309
Median Smoothing 2x2 1.1296 0.188 0.550 0.981 1.000 0.717 0.979 1.000 0.981 1.000 0.837 0.885 0.8363x3 1.9431 0.042 0.250 0.660 0.932 0.038 0.681 0.918 0.750 0.929 0.041 0.077 0.486
Non-local Mean
11-3-2 0.2770 0.125 0.400 0.830 0.955 0.717 0.915 0.939 0.077 0.054 0.265 0.154 0.484
11-3-4 0.7537 0.167 0.525 0.868 0.977 0.679 0.936 1.000 0.250 0.232 0.245 0.269 0.551
13-3-2 0.2910 0.125 0.375 0.849 0.977 0.717 0.915 0.939 0.077 0.054 0.286 0.173 0.490
13-3-4 0.8290 0.167 0.525 0.887 0.977 0.642 0.936 1.000 0.269 0.232 0.224 0.250 0.547
Best Attack-Specific Single Squeezer - 0.188 0.550 0.981 1.000 0.717 0.979 1.000 0.981 1.000 0.837 0.885 -
Best Joint Detection (5-bit, 2x2, 13-3-2) 1.1402 0.208 0.550 0.981 1.000 0.774 1.000 1.000 0.981 1.000 0.837 0.885 0.845
Im
ag
eN
et
Bit Depth
1-bit 1.9942 0.151 0.444 0.042 0.021 0.048 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - 0.083
2-bit 1.9512 0.132 0.511 0.500 0.354 0.286 0.170 0.306 0.218 0.191 - - 0.293
3-bit 1.4417 0.132 0.556 0.979 1.000 0.476 0.787 1.000 0.836 1.000 - - 0.751
4-bit 0.7996 0.038 0.089 0.813 1.000 0.381 0.915 1.000 0.727 1.000 - - 0.664
5-bit 0.3528 0.057 0.022 0.688 0.958 0.310 0.957 1.000 0.473 1.000 - - 0.606
Median Smoothing 2x2 1.1472 0.358 0.422 0.958 1.000 0.714 0.894 1.000 0.982 1.000 - - 0.8163x3 1.6615 0.264 0.444 0.917 0.979 0.500 0.723 0.980 0.909 1.000 - - 0.749
Non-local Mean
11-3-2 0.7107 0.113 0.156 0.813 0.979 0.357 0.936 0.980 0.418 0.830 - - 0.618
11-3-4 1.0387 0.208 0.467 0.958 1.000 0.548 0.936 1.000 0.673 0.957 - - 0.747
13-3-2 0.7535 0.113 0.156 0.813 0.979 0.357 0.936 0.980 0.418 0.851 - - 0.620
13-3-4 1.0504 0.226 0.444 0.958 1.000 0.548 0.936 1.000 0.709 0.957 - - 0.751
Best Attack-Specific Single Squeezer - 0.358 0.556 0.979 1.000 0.714 0.957 1.000 0.982 1.000 - - -
Best Joint Detection (5-bit, 2x2, 11-3-4) 1.2128 0.434 0.644 0.979 1.000 0.786 0.915 1.000 0.982 1.000 - - 0.859
adversary and needs to select a configuration that works well
against a distribution of possible attacks.
Training. The training phase of our detector is simply selecting
an optimal threshold of scorejoint. One typical practice is to
find the one that maximizes the training accuracy. Since the
actual expected distribution of samples is not balanced and
mostly benign, however, a detector with high accuracy but a
high false positve rate would be useless for many security-
sensitive tasks. Therefore, we instead select a threshold that
targets a false positive rate below 5% by choosing a threshold
that is exceeded by no more than 5% of legitimate samples.
Note that the training threshold is set using only the legitimate
examples, so does not depend on the adversarial examples.
Consequently, our method is inexpensive in the training phase
compared with other methods like sample statistics or training
a detector as we introduce in Section 2-D, but could be more
expensive than training a detector during inference due to the
squeezing operations and the multiple inputs.
Validation. Next, we use the chosen threshold value to
measure the detection rate on three groups: successful adver-
sarial examples (SAEs), failed adversarial examples (FAEs),
and legitimate examples (for false positive rate). Except when
noted explicitly, “detection rate” means the detection rate on
successful adversarial examples. It is important to distinguish
failed adversarial examples from legitimate examples here
since detecting failed adversarial examples is useful for detect-
ing attacks early, whereas an alarm on a legitimate example is
always undesirable and is counted as a false positive.
C. Results
Table 4 shows the detection rates for successful adver-
sarial examples for each attack method with a variety of
configurations. For each dataset, we first list the detection
rate for several detectors built upon single squeezers. For each
squeezing method, we tried several parameters and compare
the performance for each dataset. The “Best Attack-Specific
Single Squeezer” row gives the detection rate for the best
single squeezer against a particular attack. This represents
the (unrealistically optimistic) case where the model opera-
tor knows the attack type and selects a single squeezer for
detection that may be different for each attack. Below this, we
show the best result of joint detection (to be discussed later)
with multiple squeezers where the same configuration must be
used for all attacks.
The best bit depth reduction for MNIST is squeezing the
color bits to one, which achieves at least 97.87% detection for
all the L∞ and L2 attacks and 100% detection rate for seven
of the attacks. It is not as effective on CW0 attacks, however,
since these attacks are making large changes to a small number
of pixels. On the contrary, the 3 × 3 median smoothing is the
most effective on detecting the L0 attacks with detection rates
above 88%. This matches the observation from Table 3 that
they have different strengths for improving the model accuracy.
For MNIST, there is at least one squeezer that provides good
(> 91%) detection results for all of the attacks.
For CIFAR-10, 2 × 2 median smoothing is the best single
squeezer for detecting every attack except DeepFool, which is
best detected by non-local means. This is consistent with the
robustness results in Table 3. For the ImageNet dataset, we
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TABLE 5: Summary results for the best joint detectors.
Dataset Detector Threshold Detection(SAEs)
Detection
(FAEs) FPR
ROC-AUC
(Excluding FAEs)
MNIST Bit Depth (1-bit),Median (2 × 2) 0.0029 98.15% 20.00% 3.98% 99.44%
CIFAR-10
Bit Depth (5-bit),
Median (2 × 2),
Non-local Means (13-3-2)
1.1402 84.53% 22.22% 4.93% 95.74%
ImageNet
Bit Depth (5-bit),
Median (2 × 2),
Non-local Means (11-3-4)
1.2128 85.94% 25.00% 8.33% 94.24%
SAE: successful adversarial example. FAE: failed adversarial example.
TABLE 6: Comparison with MagNet.
Dataset Method AEs SAEs
MNIST
Feature
Squeezing 69.08% 78.75%
MagNet 91.77% 95.61%
CIFAR-10
Feature
Squeezing 60.87% 61.88%
MagNet 50.36% 50.46%
False positive rate for both is 0.40% on
MNIST, 1.28% on CIFAR-10.
find several different squeezers are similarly effective on each
attack type. For example, the CW2-LL attack can be detected
100% of the time with several bit depth filters, 2 × 2 median
smoothing, and some of the non-local mean filters.
The third column in the table gives the distance threshold
setting needed to satisfy the maximum false positive rate of
5% in the training dataset. These threshold values provide
some insight into how well a particular squeezer distinguishes
between adversarial and legitimate examples. For the binary
filter on MNIST, a tiny threshold value of 0.0005 was sufficient
to produce a false positive rate below 5%, which means the
squeezing has negligible impact on the legitimate examples:
95% of the legitimate examples have the L1-based distance
score below 0.0005. On the other hand, the best median
smoothing filter (2 × 2) on MNIST needs a larger threshold
value 0.0029 to achieve a similar false positive rate, which
means it is slightly more destructive than the binary filter on
the legitimate examples. The more aggressive median smooth-
ing with 3×3 window results in an even higher threshold 0.039,
because the legitimate examples could get over-squeezed to
the target classifier. A lower threshold is always preferred
for detection since it means the detector is more sensitive to
adversarial examples.
For some of the attacks, none of the feature squeezing
methods work well enough for the color datasets. The worst
cases, surprisingly, are for FGSM and BIM, two of the earlier
adversarial methods. The best single-squeezer-detection only
recognizes 18.75% of the successful FGSM examples and 55%
of BIM examples on the CIFAR-10 dataset, while the detection
rates are 35.85% and 55.56% on ImageNet. We suspect the
reason the tested squeezers are less effective against these
attacks is because they make larger perturbations than the
more advanced attacks (especially the CW attacks), and the
feature squeezers we use are well suited to mitigating small
perturbations. Understanding why these detection rates are so
much lower than the others, and developing feature squeezing
methods that work well against these attacks is an important
avenue for future research.
Joint-Detection with Multiple Squeezers. By comparing the
last two rows of each dataset in Table 4, we see that joint-
detection often outperforms the best detector with a single
squeezer. For example, the best single-squeezer-detection de-
tects 97.87% of the CW2-Next examples for CIFAR-10, while
joint detection detects 100%.
The main reason to use multiple squeezers, however, is
because this is necessary to detect unknown attacks. Since the
model operator is unlikely to know what attack adversaries
may use, it is important to be able to set up the detection
system to work well against any attack. For each data set, we
try several combinations of the three squeezers with different
parameters and find out the configuration that has the best
detection results across all the adversarial methods (shown
as the “Best Joint Detection” in Table 4, and summarized in
Table 5). For MNIST, the best combination was the 1-bit depth
squeezer with 2 × 2 median smoothing (98.15% detection),
combining the best parameters for each type of squeezer. For
the color image datasets, different combinations were found
to outperform combining the best squeezers of each type.
The best joint detection configuration for ImageNet (85.94%
detection) includes the 5-bit depth squeezer, even though the
3-bit depth squeezer was better as a single squeezer.
Since the joint detector needs to maintain the 5% false
positive rate requirement, it has a higher threshold than the
individual squeezers. This means in some cases its detection
rate for a particular attack will be worse than the best single
squeezer achieves. However, comparing the “Best Attack-
Specific Single Squeezer” and “Best Joint Detection” rows in
Table 4 reveals that the joint detection is usually competitive
with the best single squeezers over all the attacks. For MNIST,
the biggest drop is for detection rate for CW0 (LL) attacks
drops from 100% to 93%; for CIFAR-10, the joint squeezer
always outperforms the best single squeezer; for ImageNet,
the detection rate drops for CW2 (Next) (95% to 91%). For
simplicity, we use a single threshold across all of the squeezers
in a joint detector; we expect there are better ways to combine
multiple squeezers that would use different thresholds for each
of the squeezers to avoid this detection reduction, and plan to
study this in future work.
We report ROC-AUC scores in Table 5 excluding the
failed adversarial examples from consideration, since it is
not clear what the correct output should be for a failed
adversarial example. Our joint-detector achieves around 95%
ROC-AUC score on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. The ROC-AUC
of the detector is as high as 99.44% for MNIST. The false
positive rates on legitimate examples are all near 5%, which
is expected considering how we select a threshold value in the
training phase. The detection rate for the best configuration
on successful adversarial examples exceeds 98% for MNIST
using a 1-bit filter and a 2×2 median filter and near 85% for the
other two datasets using a combination of three types feature
squeezing methods with different parameters. The detection
rates for failed adversarial examples are much lower than those
for successful adversarial examples, but much higher than the
false positive rate for legitimate examples. This is unsurprising
since FAEs are attempted adversarial examples, but since they
are not successful the prediction outputs for the unsqueezed
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and squeezed inputs are more similar.
We compare our results with MagNet [24] in Table 6. We
configured the MagNet detectors on two datasets following
the description in their paper and reported the detection per-
formance with our target models and the detection dataset.
In order to fairly compare the detection rates, we adjusted
the threshold values of our detectors accordingly on the two
datasets to produce the false positive rates matching the
MagNet results: 0.40% for MNIST and 1.28% for CIFAR-10.
MagNet achieves higher detection rates on MNIST (91.77%
over 69.08%), while our method outperformed on CIFAR-10
(60.87% over 50.36%). The detection rates excluding failed
adversarial examples were similar. MagNet’s detection rates on
our adversarial examples for MNIST are impressive, and supe-
rior to what the best feature squeezing configuration achieves.
However, this advantage does not apply to CIFAR-10. Further,
it is more expensive to use MagNet because it requires training
an autoencoder on a whole dataset. In addition, the MagNet
pipeline is end-to-end differentiable, making it vulnerable to
trivial white-box adversary.
D. Adversarial Adaptation
So far, we have only considered static adversaries who do
not adapt to attack our feature squeezing method directly. Now,
we consider adaptive adversaries who have full knowledge of
the defense. To be successful against our detection framework,
an adversary needs to find an input where the original classifier
produces the wrong output and the L1 score between the
model’s predictions on squeezed and original inputs is below
the detection threshold. This is a much harder problem than
just finding an adversarial example, as is supported by our
experimental results.
He et al. [13] recently proposed an adaptive attack which
can successfully find adversarial examples that defeat one
configuration of a feature squeezing defense.3 The approach
finds adversarial examples that both confuse the original model
and have a scorejoint lower than a pre-selected threshold for
squeezed inputs. Their approach adapts the CW2 attack by
adding a penalty term for the L1 prediction distance. It requires
that all the feature squeezing operators are differentiable so
that it is possible to compute the gradient of the loss function
in the optimization process. For the non-differentiable feature
squeezers such as the bit depth reduction, their approach
requires restarting the algorithm several times with random
initialization and hoping it finds an example that is resilient
against the non-differentiable squeezers. This means the attack
is non-deterministic and more time-consuming in face of non-
diffrentiable components [13]. The attack takes roughly 20
seconds on each MNIST sample, which is around 60 times
slower than the original CW2 attack.
We only evaluate their adaptive attack on the MNIST
dataset, because we currently don’t have a Tensorflow imple-
mentation of the non-local means filter used on CIFAR-10 and
3This work was done following initial public reports on the work in this
paper [42, 43]; we shared details of our approach and code with the authors
of [13], and much appreciate their sharing their implementation with us to
enable the experiments reported here.
ImageNet.4 We adapted their attacking code to our MNIST
model and the joint-detector we report in Table 5.
In addition to the untargeted attack He et al. tested, we also
tested the two targeted attacks mentioned earlier in Section 4.
We used the same parameters as He et al. [13] in generating the
adaptive adversarial examples except that we change the target
threshold value to 0.0029 that is used by the detector in this
paper.5 The seed examples are the same 100 images used in
Section 4. With the exact threshold we use in this paper as the
target value, the success rate of the untargeted attack is 68%
(compared with 100% success rate in He et al.’s report [13]).
The success rates of the targeted attacks are even lower: 44%
for the targeted-next attack and 24% for the targeted-ll attack.
We believe these lower adversarial success rates are due to
using a different MNIST model (representative of a state-of-
the-art model) and our detector has a much smaller threshold
value (0.0029) compared to the one they used (over 0.3076).
However, the success rates reported in the adaptive attack
do not provide a useful measure of robustness because the
discussed adaptive adversary is allowed to modify any pixel
arbitrarily. Given unlimited perturbation bounds, one could
always force a model to misclassify an example into any
class, but often by producing images that are unrecognizable
or obviously suspicious to humans. Figure 6 shows typical
examples produced by the adaptive attack. In order to un-
derstand the robustness of our detector in a more realistic
setting, we clipped the perturbations with different  values
ranging from 0 to 1. Figure 7 shows the adversary success
rates as the adversary’s strength  increases to the right. At
0.3, the  value considered a reasonable limit on what is
a permissible adversarial example by many papers [21], the
adversary’s success rate is 0% for both of the target attacks
and 1% for the untargeted attack.
Countermeasures. One obvious strategy to combat adap-
tive adversaries is to introduce randomness in the squeezing
method. This is very different from attempts to obfuscate
models, which have been shown vulnerable to transfer at-
tacks. Instead, we can use cryptographic randomness to make
the deployed framework unpredictable, since the adversary’s
search requires knowledge of the exact squeezing operation.
The defender has many opportunities to use randomness in
selecting squeezing parameters. For example, instead of using
a fixed 0.5 threshold for the 1-bit filter, using 0.5 ± rand(0.1)
(which could be done with a different random value for each
pixel), or selecting random regions for the median smoothing
instead of a fixed 2 × 2 region).
We conducted an experiment in which the cutoff value of
the binary filter follows a normal distribution with 0.5 mean
and standard deviation 0.0625. The success rates (with no limit
on perturbation magnitude) decrease from (68%, 44%, 24%)
to (17.0 ± 2.4%, 16.2 ± 2.6%, 7.6 ± 2.2%) (respectively for
untargeted, targeted to next class, and targeted to least likely;
measured over 10 executions).
4He et al. reported results for CIFAR-10 with only bit depth reduction and
median smoothing [13]. These results were similar to the results they reported
on MNIST.
5He et al.’s target detector was based on an earlier version of this work
that used 0.3076 as threshold and uses a slightly different max function in
combining multiple squeezers.
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Fig. 6: Adversarial examples generated by the adaptive adversary. The images are randomly sampled from the successful adversarial examples
generated by the adaptive adversarial methods. No successful adversarial examples were found for Targeted (LL) 3 or 8. The average L2 norms of the successful
adversarial examples are respectively 2.80, 4.14, 4.67 for the untargeted, targeted (next) and targeted (ll) examples; while the corresponding values are 3.63, 5.48,
5.76 for the ensemble-adaptive adversarial examples. The average L∞ norm are 0.79, 0.89, 0.88 for the adaptive adversarial examples; while the corresponding
values are 0.89, 0.95 and 0.96 for the ensemble-adaptive adversarial examples.
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Fig. 7: Adaptive adversary success rates.
An adversary may attempt to adapt to the randomness by
attacking an ensemble of random squeezers. We consider an
ensemble-adaptive adversary that considers three thresholds
of the binary filter together: 0.4, 0.5 and 0.6. The success
rates increase to (46.5± 2.1%, 34.5± 3.5%, 28.5± 2.1%) mea-
sured over 10 executions. However, the perturbations became
even larger, resulting in many unrecognizable and suspicious-
looking images (shown in the right part of Figure 6).
6. Conclusion
The effectiveness of feature squeezing seems surprising
since it is so simple and inexpensive compared to other pro-
posed defenses. Developing a theory of adversarial examples
remains an illusive goal, but our intuition is that the effective-
ness of squeezing stems from how it reduces the search space
of possible perturbations available to an adversary.
Although we have so far only experimented with image
classification models, the feature-squeezing approach could
be used in many domains where deep learning is used. For
example, Carlini et al. demonstrated that lowering the sampling
rate helps to defend against the adversarial voice commands
[5]. Hosseini et al. proposed that correcting the spelling on
inputs before they are provided to a character-based toxic text
detection system can defend against adversarial examples [15].
As discussed in Section 5-D, feature squeezing is not im-
mune to adversarial adaptation, but it substantially changes the
challenge an adversary faces. Our general detection framework
opens a new research direction in defending against adversarial
examples and understanding the limits of deep neural networks
in adversarial contexts.
Availability
The models and our implementations of the attacks, de-
fenses, and tests, are available in the EvadeML-Zoo open
source toolkit (https://evadeML.org/zoo).
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